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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)1 is set against a history of 
frustration. The concessions through the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) system have fallen well short of expectations.2 Current 
concessions in service sectors date from the conclusion of the GATS at 
the end of the Uruguay Round in 1995. Ten years of service negotiations 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) have failed to produce 
conclusive results,3 and stand-alone service negotiations in 2000 failed to 
make progress.4 Of the 211 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in 
force in 2012, only 89 cover services. The United States, Singapore, and 
Chile negotiated the majority of these agreements primarily after 2000.5 
One veteran of the Doha negotiations lamented that because the Doha 
negotiators were discouraged by the complexity of service liberalization, 
they “spent maybe five–ten percent of their time on services and sixty–
seventy percent of their time on goods and agriculture.”6 As stated by 
Deputy USTR Michael Punke in 2012, the “genesis of [TISA]…lies in 
our hard-nosed assessment that we simply will not be able to make real 
progress on services trade liberalization any time soon under existing 
WTO frameworks.”7  
 Service negotiations are hard. The glaring and unexamined question 
is: Why? This paper will examine the current trade literature on what is 
known about TISA to date and subject that information to a feasibility 
analysis for trade in service agreements. The goal is to understand what 
went wrong in previous attempts to liberalize services and/or trade, what 
might be going wrong in TISA, and how it might be made right. In the 
end, the article will conclude that TISA’s potential will not be realized 
on its current course. The only feasible aspects of the agreement are its 
recognition of dormant economic and political potential. Deficiencies 
include multilateral consensus, regulatory hurdles, credence among the 
parties, and a basic understanding of the effects of service liberalization. 
Further lacking are the resources needed to approach these deficiencies. 
This paper offers two primary recommendations. First, there is a need for 
more research, theory and data collection on trade in services to address 
a critical lack in both understanding and persuasive power. Second, there 
is a need for an independent multilateral effort toward regulatory 
                                                
 1 The working name of the services agreement was changed from an “International Services 
Agreement (ISA)” to the “Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)” immediately prior to the 
publication of U.S., EU at Odds, infra note 27. 
 2 Stuart Harbinson & Aik Hoe Lim, Trade in Services, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A 
QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AGREEMENT 133, 133 (C. J. Lim et al. eds., 2012).  
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 134. 
 5 Id. at 135. 
 6 J. Bradford Jensen, Book Release Address given at the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics: Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts, and Offshoring (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.piie.com/events/event_detail.cfm?EventID=202. 
 7 USTR Takes First Steps to Services Negotiations, WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT (Jan. 21, 
2013) [hereinafter WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT]. 
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convergence—prior to TISA—with recognition of the supremacy of 
national decision-making. 
 Part I will describe the elements and issues of TISA as they stand at 
this point in negotiations. Part II will work through a seven-factor 
feasibility analysis of the agreement. Part III will draw upon the 
preceding analysis to offer recommendations. 
 
II.  THE ELEMENTS OF TISA  
 
A. Plurilateral Negotiations 
 
TISA was proposed in a policy brief from the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics in January 2012.8 Since then, preliminary talks 
have taken place among a plurilateral group of twenty-one WTO 
members9 originally referred to as the “Real Good Friends” of Services 
coalition.10 In December 2012, participants agreed to a rough framework 
for the formal discussions.11 Formal notification of negotiations was 
provided to the U.S. Congress in January 2013,12 where the initiative 
already enjoyed strong support.13 However, other TISA Negotiating 
Parties (Negotiating Parties) must fulfill their own domestic procedures 
for beginning a new trade negotiation before full negotiations may 
begin.14 The details of TISA negotiations and scheduling are unsettled,15 
but if everything works as planned, the agreement is anticipated to 
conclude by 2014.16  
                                                
 8 Peterson Institute Argues for Services Deal Along Lines of U.S. Position, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 
(May 3, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-05/04/2012/peterson-
institute-argues-for-services-deal-along-lines-of-us-position/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter Peterson 
Institute]. 
 9 These members are: Canada, the United States and Mexico in North America; the European 
Union plus Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland in Europe; Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea in Asia; Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru in Central 
and South America; and Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey in the Middle East. Matthew Kronby & Milos 
Barutciski, The Trade in Services Agreement: Opportunities for Canadian Service Suppliers, 
BENNETT JONES LLP, (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.bennettjones.com/Publications/Updates/The_ 
Trade _ in_ Services_Agreement__ Opportunities_for_Canadian_Service_Suppliers/#page=1. 
 10 WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 1; Punke Outlines U.S.-EU Differences on ITA 
Expansion, New Services Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 22, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-
US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-03/23/2012/punke-outlines-us-eu-differences-on-ita-expansion-new-
services-deal/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter Punke Outlines].  
 11 USTR Says It Will Seek To Cover New Services In Plurilateral Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://insidetrade.com /Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-01/18/2013/ustr-says-it-
will-seek-to-cover-new-services-in-plurilateral-agreement/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter USTR 
Says]. 
 12 WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 1. 
 13 WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 5. 
 14 USTR Says, supra note 11. 
 15 Amy Porges, Panel discussion at the International Trade and Law Society Distinguished 
Alumni Dinner: The Impact of a Successful E.U.-U.S. Trade Agreement and the Transpacific 
Partnership Agreement on World Trade (Apr. 22, 2013) (on file with American University, 
Washington College of Law). 
 16 Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
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B. A Standalone Deal Outside of the WTO 
 A subset of WTO members committed to trade liberalization is 
negotiating TISA as a stand-alone deal outside the WTO.17 However, 
other WTO members could potentially join the negotiations, and the deal 
could later be brought into the WTO framework through a vote of 
members, similar to the manner in which the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA) was brought under the WTO.18 
C. Market Access Expectations 
 TISA negotiations are expected to reflect new types of services that 
have emerged since GATS was negotiated.19 These Negotiating Parties 
generally seek to expand market access concessions.20 Sectors that have 
been expressly included on the agenda are telecommunications,21 
insurance,22 digital media,23 engineering,24 accounting,25 higher 
education,26 and audiovisual services.27 
D. Positive List for Scheduling Market Access Concessions 
 Negotiating Parties have agreed to a positive list for scheduling 
market access concessions28 that obligates countries to open only those 
                                                
 17 Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 18 Peterson Institute, supra note 8. 
 19 Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 20 Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 21 Jeffrey J. Schott et al., Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in 99 POLICY ANALYSES 
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 31 (2013). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 21; Office of the United States Trade Representative, Interagency Trade Policy Group 
Holds Public Hearing on Negotiating Objectives for International Services Agreement Negotiations, 
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/march/tpsc-services-
hearing (quoting Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Services Christopher P. Melly’s 
Opening Statement at a Public Hearing before the Trade Policy Staff Committee on an International 
Services Agreement). 
 24 Schott et al., supra note 21; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra 
note 23. 
 25 Schott et al., supra note 21; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra 
note 23. 
 26 Schott et al., supra note 21; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra 
note 23. 
 27 The European Union has never made, and does not want to make, any commitments on 
audiovisual services, but the U.S. has indicated that it will press Europe on this issue. U.S., EU at 
Odds Over Audiovisual Services In Plurilateral Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-03/29/2013/us-eu-at-odds-over-
audiovisual-services-in-plurilateral-negotiations/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter U.S., EU at Odds]. 
 28 Compromise ‘Hybrid’ Approach For Services Deal Largely Follows GATS, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Oct. 9, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/201210092412372/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-
News/compromise-hybrid-approach-for-services-deal-largely-follows-gats/menu-id-948.html 
[hereinafter Compromise]; Geneva Services Group Picks Scheduling Approach To Attract BRICS, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 7, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/201302072423893/WTO-Daily-
News/Daily-News/geneva-services-group-picks-scheduling-approach-to-attract-brics/menu-id-
948.html [hereinafter Geneva].  
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sectors that they specifically schedule to foreign competition.29 A 
negative list would open all sectors to foreign competition, except for 
sectors carved-out of the agreement. 
 The use of a positive list approach has no real consequences for the 
negotiation of market access concessions as compared to a negative list 
approach.30 A negative list with a great number of carve-outs would be 
identical to a limited positive list. These two approaches can be thought 
of as glass-half-full and glass-half-empty perspectives on scheduling 
concessions and may affect early negotiations in a corresponding way—
it is easier to begin with the optimistic attitude that accompanies positive 
control as opposed to the pessimistic attitude that accompanies negative 
control. Concrete consequences resulting from the choice of methods 
could arise for future, not-yet-existent services, which would 
automatically be covered by a negative list. Those sectors could not be 
specifically listed at the time of negotiation, but would be subject to 
inclusion in the agreement through periodical negotiations under the 
positive approach.31 Coverage of not-yet-existent services was an explicit 
goal of the United States;32 however, negotiators have indicated that not-
yet-existent services might still be captured through a flexible definition 
of service categories or a process for modernizing concessions after an 
initial deal is inked.33 Additionally, the positive list approach more 
closely follows the GATS scheduling commitments,34 which a) makes 
TISA easier to potentially integrate into the current GATS architecture;35 
b) makes it easier for the European Commission to argue that TISA is a 
continuation of the multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round and, 
thereby, avoid requesting a new negotiating mandate; and, c) 
acknowledges Negotiating Parties’ interest in attracting China and other 
emerging markets to a more familiar agreement.36 
E. Negative List for National Treatment Commitments 
(The New Hybrid Approach) 
 Under the GATS structure, WTO members also used a positive list to 
negotiate national treatment. In other words, in those areas that WTO 
members agreed to liberalize, they reserved the right to treat domestic 
providers more favorably than foreign ones except in those specific areas 
                                                
 29 Compromise, supra note 28; Geneva, supra note 28.  
 30 U.S., Other WTO Members See ‘Hybrid’ Approach On Services Plurilateral, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Sept. 20, 2012) http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-09/21/2012/us-
other-wto-members-see-hybrid-approach-on-services-plurilateral/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter 
Hybrid]. 
 31 ‘Positive List’ In Services Deal Requires Periodic Renegotiation Says CSI President, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/201302052423579/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-
News/positive-list-in-services-deal-requires-periodic-renegotiation-says-csi-president/menu-id-
948.html [hereinafter Positive List]; USTR Says, supra note 11. 
 32 Positive List, supra note 31; USTR Says, supra note 11. 
 33 Positive List, supra note 31; USTR Says, supra note 11. 
 34 Geneva, supra note 28. 
 35 Geneva, supra note 28; Positive List, supra note 31; Hybrid, supra note 30.  
 36 Geneva, supra note 28; Hybrid, supra note 30. 
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where they agreed to National Treatment commitments. In TISA, by 
contrast, members will be obligated to provide full National Treatment 
commitments in all liberalized sectors unless they specifically carve-out 
the areas in which they reserve the right to treat domestic providers more 
favorably than foreign ones.37 Using a combination of positive and 
negative lists to schedule market access and National Treatment 
commitments has been labeled a “hybrid” approach.38 Expansion of the 
principle of nondiscrimination was a stated goal of the Negotiating 
Parties.39 
F. Ratchet-in & Standstill Lock-ins for National Treatment 
(But Not for Market Access) 
 TISA is expected to lock in liberalization undertaken unilaterally by 
parties since the GATS came into force.40 The Negotiating Parties have 
agreed that TISA will prohibit signatories from going back on National 
Treatment commitments that exist under their current regime.41 This is 
referred to as the standstill commitment. TISA negotiators will also 
extend unilateral National Treatment commitments to all other 
signatories, preventing them from backing off those concessions,42 an 
obligation referred to as a ratchet.  
 Like the positive list for scheduling market access concessions, 
Negotiating Parties adopted these approaches in part to attract other 
WTO members to the agreement in the future. In GATS, the ratchet and 
standstill obligations also apply only to National Treatment 
commitments, and not to market access concessions.43 However, 
Negotiating Parties viewed application of the ratchet and standstill 
obligations as potentially inhibiting to future liberalization, if signatories’ 
incremental improvements to market access were inflexible and legally 
binding.44 
                                                
 37 Compromise, supra note 28; Geneva, supra note 28; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9; 
USTR Says, supra note 11. 
 38 Geneva, supra note 28; Positive List, supra note 31. 
 39 Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk Notifies 
Congress of Intent to Negotiate New International Trade Agreement on Services (Jan. 15, 2013) 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/january/ustr-kirk-notifies-congress-
new-itas-negotiations [hereinafter USTR Notification]; Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, supra note 23; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 40 USTR Notification, supra note 39; Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra 
note 23; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 41 Geneva, supra note 28. 
 42 Geneva, supra note 28. 
 43 Geneva, supra note 28. 
 44 WTO Members Discuss Services Deal Elements Linked To Potential Expansion, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Oct. 4, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-10/05/2012/wto-
members-discuss-services-deal-elements-linked-to-potential-expansion/menu-id-710.html. 
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G. Expectations for New Rules 
 TISA negotiators have been given a weighty and complex task in 
assembling a “gold standard, A-grade agreement.”45 However, they need 
not start from scratch. There is already an extensive network of bilateral 
and regional preferential trade agreements among the negotiating 
countries, stakeholder and public interest contributions to Negotiating 
Parties, half-concluded negotiations under the Doha round, and parallel 
plurilateral service negotiations under the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
Drawing on those precedents, the January 2012 Peterson Institute 
briefing paper recommended that particular provisions of GATS be 
bolstered in TISA,46 creating a “GATS-plus” agreement. 
 Some provisions will be procedural—the United States has indicated 
that it wants to ensure greater transparency and predictability for its 
service providers from their trading partners.47 Among other issues, the 
January 2012 Peterson Institute briefing paper recommended that TISA 
include new competition policy and mutual recognition of professional 
credentials.48 On cross-border data flows,49 the United States has 
indicated that it will propose equal treatment for electronically delivered 
goods and services, absolute freedom of cross-border data transfers, and 
freedom from regulations requiring companies to locate data servers in 
any particular location.50 Australia and New Zealand are opposed to 
freedom of cross-border data transfers on the grounds that such transfers 
might not provide adequate protection and control over their citizens’ 
electronic data.51 
 Other provisions will be specific to a particular sector. On financial 
services, for instance, the United States may push for GATS-plus market 
access, including the right to establish commercial presence, one hundred 
percent ownership, and the provision of cross-border services without the 
requirement to establish commercial presence.52 Participants have 
generally agreed to address provisions such as licensing53 and barriers on 
investment, including requirements as to residency, form of 
                                                
 45 Mexican WTO Official Advocates Two Stages For New Services Agreement, INSIDE U.S 
TRADE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-12/21/2012/csi-
president-confident-ustr-will-push-for-soe-rules-in-plurilateral-deal/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter 
Mexican]. 
 46 Peterson Institute, supra note 8. 
 47 USTR Notification, supra note 39; Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra 
note 23; USTR Says, supra note 11. 
 48 Peterson Institute, supra note 8. 
 49 Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9; Joshua Meltzer, The Internet, Cross-Border Data Flows 
and International Trade, BROOKINGS RESEARCH (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/25-internet-data-flows-international-trade-
meltzer. 
 50 CSI President ‘Confident’ USTR Will Push For SOE Rules In Plurilateral Deal, INSIDE U.S 
TRADE (Dec. 20, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-12/21/2012/csi-
president-confident-ustr-will-push-for-soe-rules-in-plurilateral-deal/menu-id-710.html [hereinafter 
CSI President]. 
 51 Schott et al., supra note 21, at 32. 
 52 Schott et al., supra note 21, at 21. 
 53 Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
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establishment, participation in joint ventures, or the satisfaction of 
economic needs tests.54 
 Both the European Union and the United States have indicated that it 
is unlikely that members involved in the plurilateral negotiations will 
have to make commitments on opening up to private competition 
government-provided services, such as public water utilities.55 However, 
the “trade distorting actions” of State Owned Enterprises are an issue 
likely to be raised in the negotiations and unfavorably received by other 
WTO members.56 Some parties, although certainly not all, will likely 
support provisions addressing government procurement of services.57 
 Another specific matter that some of the parties have marked as 
important is allowing individuals to go to other countries to supply 
services (called Mode 4 supply in GATS).58 Discussions on cross-border 
movement of workers would begin with improving temporary entry for 
business people, professionals, and technical experts, including intra-
company transfers, which can be important for businesses operating in 
foreign markets.59 The Peterson Institute for International Economics has 
proposed going further, with liberal rules for the movement of semi-
skilled workers.60 The United States is generally opposed to 
liberalization of Mode 4, due to the impact on domestic immigration 
concerns.61 Turkey has taken an opposite tack and proposed an entire 
separate chapter on Mode 4, including binding regulations on how 
countries grant visas.62  
III.  A FEASIBILITY TEST FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 There are seven interrelated factors making cooperation on broad and 
deep plurilateral liberalization of trade in services increasingly 
difficult—seven questions which may highlight TISA’s capability to 
reach its ambitious liberalization and multilateralization goals. First, does 
TISA and/or services liberalization have the potential to increase trade 
and make money? Second, what is the collective will among WTO 
members to implement services liberalization and eventually 
multilateralize TISA under WTO? Third, what are the domestic political 
obstacles to participation in TISA? Fourth, what is the potential for 
critical regulatory convergence among the major international economic 
players? Fifth, what impact could the recent history of cooperative 
efforts have on the liberalization and multilateralization of TISA? Sixth, 
                                                
 54 Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 55 U.S., EU at Odds, supra note 27. 
 56 WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT, supra note 7 at 5; CSI President, supra note 50. 
 57 Peterson Institute, supra note 8; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 58 Peterson Institute, supra note 8; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 59 Peterson Institute, supra note 8; Kronby & Barutciski, supra note 9. 
 60 Peterson Institute, supra note 8. 
 61 Peterson Institute, supra note 8. 
 62 EU Proposal On Horizontal Disciplines In Services Talks Met With Skepticism, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Mar. 28, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-03/29/2013/eu-
proposal-on-horizontal-disciplines-in-services-talks-met-with-skepticism/menu-id-172.html. 
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what do we actually know about the functioning of trade in services 
under liberalization, and is it enough to actually predict results? Seventh, 
do negotiators from each country (or at least the major players) have 
access to sufficient resources of staff and finances to effectively 
complete the negotiations? 
A. The Economic Factor: No Risks in Liberalization for the Developed 
Countries 
 The first question is whether a new trade plurilateral agreement has 
the potential to benefit the parties economically. The economic size of 
the parties involved in the agreement is substantial. TISA involves 
twenty-one Negotiating Parties, representing forty-seven economies, and 
nearly two-thirds of global services.63 Generally, domestic service 
production is the dominant economic activity in the world.64 In low-
income economies, service sectors accounted for 45% of GDP, which 
climbs to 57% in middle-income economies, and almost 71% in high-
income economies.65 
 The first factor is whether liberalizing trade in services will actually 
stimulate those large numbers. If goods and services are essentially 
economic equivalents, there is a clear and simple economic argument for 
the liberalization of services: liberalization of trade in goods has 
correlated very strongly with growth,66 and services (unlike goods) are 
relatively un-liberalized.67 There is, however, considerable debate as to 
whether trade in services is the same kind of trade as trade in goods, and 
therefore whether the strong correlation of growth with liberalization 
ought to apply, in theory, to services as well. This potential lack of 
theoretical understanding dovetails into issues considered under the sixth 
factor of feasibility. It is possible that the effects of services liberalization 
are well understood and economically valuable, or neither well-
understood nor economically valuable, or only one but not the other. 
Unfortunately, while the debate is ongoing and evidence is scarce, it is 




                                                
 63 Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 23. 
64 MAX PLANCK, WTO: TRADE IN SERVICES at ix (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Peter-Tobias Stoll eds., 
2008). 
 65 Juan A. Marchetti, Developing Countries in the WTO Services Negotiations: Doing Enough?, 
in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 82, 84 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis, 
eds., 2007). 
 66 Ian F Fergusson, CRS Report for Congress: World Trade Organization Negotiations: The 
Doha Development Agenda 7–8 (Jan. 18 2008). Trade “plays an independent and positive role in 
raising incomes” and productivity. OECD, Trade, Growth and Jobs, http://www.oecd.org/tad/ 
tradedev/50447052.pdf at 1. 
 67 Jensen, supra note 6. 
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1. If Service Liberalization is Similar to Goods 
  
Speaking to the lack of liberalization of services, J. Bradford Jensen, 
an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economic, 
calculates that tradable business services are five times less likely to be 
exported than manufactured products.68 He argues that if the exports-to-
sales ratio in tradable business services were increased to the same level 
as manufacturing, there would be a 40% increase in total U.S. exports.69 
As Jensen modestly assures, “[e]ven if those aren’t the right numbers, the 
right numbers are big.”70 Additionally, more service exports mean more 
jobs. USTR estimates that every $1 billion in U.S. services exports 
supports an estimated four thousand U.S. jobs,71 equating to about three 
million additional jobs. Workers in tradable services earn about 20% 
more than workers in similar industries, even accounting for their higher 
education, and service jobs are qualitatively better.72 Although these 
estimates ought to be considered on a country-by-country basis, the basic 
assumptions about the impact resulting from growth in services exports 
will often be the same for other developed countries.  
 Developed countries have the most to gain from liberalization of trade 
in services. Comparative advantage is the traditional way to think about 
the opportunities in trade—a country has trading advantage where its 
factors of production are abundant. For services, the most salient factor is 
skill/education and, in general, the United States and other developed 
countries have a great comparative advantage in the amount and quality 
of highly skilled, or highly educated, service providers.73 The United 
States is also currently the world’s largest services trader.74 Additionally, 
Jensen speculates that there are obvious future opportunities for 
developed countries to reap dividends from a coming forty trillion dollar 
global infrastructure boom, mostly in the emerging economies, involving 
architecture, financing, engineering, water treatment, and project 
management services.75 
 For the developed world, there is urgency to capturing Jensen’s 
benefits. The developing world’s comparative advantage through skilled 
labor and education is rapidly eroding. In the cohort of individuals 
between the ages of 25–29 in 2010, the level of education around the 
world has more or less flattened, compared to the same aged cohort 
thirty-five years ago (who are now earning their peak lifetime incomes), 
a cohort group in which the United States clearly had a massive 
educational comparative advantage.76 Also, the coming infrastructure 
                                                
 68 Jensen, supra note 6; USTR Notification, supra note 39. 
 69 Jensen, supra note 6. 
 70 Jensen, supra note 6. 
 71 Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 23; USTR Notification, supra 
note 39. 
 72 Jensen, supra note 6. 
 73 Jensen, supra note 6. 
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boom is likely to be (at least partially) government projects, and many 
large, fast-growing, emerging economies are not participants in the 
WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement, so interactions between 
GATS as it is and the GPA would make liberalization within those 
emerging economies difficult.77 
 If services are traded in the same way as goods—again, still an 
untested hypothesis—then the risks of the liberalization of services are 
also best considered through the lens of comparative advantage.78 There 
may79 or may not80 be justification for widespread concerns about job 
losses from adjustments in developed economies as a result of liberalized 
trade; however, even if the fears are justified, developed countries risk 
limited outsourcing losses from liberalization in services trade. Tradable 
services are skill intensive, and the United States is (still) relatively skill 
abundant.81 Jensen has further found that only about 25% of tradable 
service jobs are low-wage jobs below the U.S. threshold of comparative 
advantage—thereby subject to outsourcing. Additionally, no region in 
the United States has a high concentration of those low-wage tradable 
service jobs. The jobs that would be dislocated by liberalized service 
trade are largely in dynamic urban areas, suggesting that whatever 
impact occurred from the minimal economic displacement would be 
evenly absorbed into the background of the entire U.S. economy.82 
Again, country-by-country analysis may reveal differences, but similar 
assumptions should apply to all large, developed economies. 
 In contrast to the developed countries, the primary opportunity for 
developing economies is time. The world is experiencing a hospitable 
environment for economic catch-up.83 So long as countries have some 
combination of fundamental background conditions, ideas and blueprints 
will spread, and firms from developing countries will be able to take 
advantage of the educational and technological infrastructures of the 
developed world.84 Similarly, time can only add to what little is known 
now about the underlying factors that determine whether a developing 
country produces significant service exports. The best we can say is that 
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 80 Import growth, in general, is a sign of economic recovery, not a sign of increasing 
displacement of jobs; the effects of manufactured imports have been positive on equality and 
welfare, and manufactured imports have had no effect on jobs and wages, rather, the declining trend 
in US manufacturing employment has been driven by the combination of a shift in domestic demand 
away from spending on goods and faster productivity growth in manufacturing. Lawrence Edwards 
& Robert Lawrence, Rising Tide: Is Growth in Emerging Economies Good for the United States? 
(Oct. 18, 2011) (book release presentation, delivered at Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Washington D.C.), http://www.piie.com/events/event_detail.cfm?EventID=269. 
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education and human capital is critical for certain service sectors,85 and 
developing economies are only going to close the education gap.86 
 Jensen asserts that developing economies need access to cheap 
services to build their infrastructures.87 Additionally, service exports 
typically require much more infrastructure for the importer than the 
exporter and, in such a case, a developing country can compete on a very 
high level with minimal investment at home.88 However, negotiating 
service trade agreements is resource-intensive, and so developing 
countries that face challenges negotiating the agreement may be more 
motivated to join in when the work is done, and their own service sectors 
are stronger. 
 
2. If Service Liberalization is Different 
 
 Taking economists at their word, some progress has been made in 
analyzing the economic effects of service trades in the special form of 
trade-in-tasks, or outsourcing. Trade-in-tasks has been shown to be 
theoretically analogous to migration of foreign factors of production to 
the outsourcing nation while retaining foreign costs.89 Gene Grossman 
and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, who introduced the idea of trade-in-tasks, 
have shown that this conception of trade is economically beneficial in a 
formal analogy with technological improvement.90 At the same time, 
Robert Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud have introduced an analytic 
framework which takes into account known special cases and integrates 
trade-in-tasks theory with mainstream trade theory,91 adding certainty to 
the problem of unexpected outcomes92 and inapplicability of standard 
trade theorems.93 As it continues to develop, the theory of trade-in-tasks 
may offer further assurances that the familiar beneficial effects of trade 
liberalization under GATT will continue. 
B. The Consensus Factor: No Multilateralization 
 The second factor is the sum of any evidence for bringing the trade 
agreement to the multilateral system. In this area, the TISA Negotiating 
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Parties have made a gamble by not including the large, emerging 
economies—believing that there will be enough pressure from a final 
agreement to force a multilateral adoption.94 The desire of the TISA 
Negotiating Parties to “redefine global trade”95 and then multilateralize 
the agreement at the WTO—most likely through the use of GATT 
Article V96—has been quite explicit.97 However, despite deep divisions 
on the question of new entrants to TISA,98 the Negotiating Parties are 
unlikely to extend the benefits of a deal until a critical mass of WTO 
members join, to avoid the free riders problem—new countries receiving 
benefits from TISA without making any concessions during the 
negotiations.99 Reaching the critical mass of new entrants is an unlikely 
achievement.  
 Although many of the TISA Negotiating Parties have called for the 
removal of barriers to entry for new entrants these requests are 
contradicted by equally strong calls for deep commitments that WTO 
members are unlikely to make.100 The United States, for instance, is both 
anticipating and discouraging China’s accession to TISA with regulatory 
proposals for rules disciplining state-owned enterprises.101 
 Outside the intentions and capacities of the TISA Negotiating Parties, 
there is little indication that the large, emerging economies, in particular, 
have either the capacity or the will to join a multilateral TISA under any 
mechanism. Politically, the large, emerging economies are not 
interested,102 and they have the power to block TISA at the WTO.103 
Once a plurilateral agreement is concluded, its value may be perceived as 
having something which is denied to others—possibly motivating 
countries outside the deal to enter, but equally motivating signatories to 
refuse entry to countries outside the deal, and so hindering the political 
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task of multilateralization,104 at least in the short term. If TISA is to be a 
building block rather than a stumbling block to multilateralization, then it 
must be undertaken with a greater regard for brokering an eventual 
multilateral global consensus, with more than symbolic concessions to 
the large, emerging economies. 
C. The Constituencies Factor: Liberalization will be Subject to Political 
Skill 
 The third factor is whether governments have the support of domestic 
constituencies to take on new international commitments.105 One of the 
lessons of the collapse of nineteenth century globalization was that 
national governments will be unable to maintain open economies if they 
do not have the support of their constituents, whether they be narrow 
elites or broad masses.106 On the one hand, politicians have the advantage 
in managing constituencies. Each government’s trade agreement may be 
somewhat crafted in the first place by an active political organization and 
outside the reach of any transparency in developing trade negotiations. If 
constituent support turns against a deal, political organizations may be 
capable of pushing it through. For instance, the governments which 
negotiated NAFTA in Canada and the United States were both defeated 
in elections in which anti-NAFTA public sentiment was a significant 
factor and yet the agreement was ultimately signed by the anti-NAFTA 
successor governments. On the other hand, in virtually all countries, 
political incentives are heavily weighted on domestic problems at the 
expense of international ones,107 and political capital is not infinite. In the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, the TISA Negotiating Parties and other 
WTO members will likely face greater than normal domestic political 
resistance.108 Examples of the tenuous balance in the United States, 
European Union, and Japan, the largest players among the TISA 
Negotiating Parties, are illustrative. 
 One major American constituency is firmly in favor of trade 
liberalization: internationally oriented financial institutions and 
corporations.109 In Congress, TISA has strong early support110 and trade 
agreements have generally fared well: Congress has passed twelve of the 
fifteen PTAs with hundreds of votes to spare.111 Even the ostensibly 
nationalist and neo-isolationist112 Tea Party is not a protectionist group in 
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Congress where 65 of its 85 members have approved all the negotiations 
for three of the new PTAs.113 On the other side, public opinion toward 
international trade was more hostile in 2007 in the United States than in 
any of the other 47 countries regularly surveyed by Pew Charitable 
Trust.114 While that opinion may be changing with the demographics of 
the country,115 the majority of Americans, especially those with lower 
incomes, believe that liberalized trade reduces jobs, wages, and the 
economy as a whole.116 Only Americans with college degrees and 
incomes above $100,000 hold positive views on trade liberalization.117 
 European public opinion towards trade liberalization in general is 
more even than in the United States,118 and not as politically charged. 
However, Europeans overwhelmingly believe that globalization makes 
society more unequal, and that it is only good for large companies. As an 
example of political restructuring to win the favor of constituencies, 
economic growth is presented to the public in Europe as a defensive 
measure to protect citizens who do not have work, rather than as an 
economic reward in itself.119 As explained in The Economist, “Europe… 
is not the most dynamic and competitive economy in the world, because 
lots and lots of Europeans do not want to live in the most dynamic and 
competitive economy in the world.”120 Yet, European politicians must 
craft trade liberalization. The European Union is confronting some major 
internal economic issues, and these problems are likely to draw upon 
much of its politicians’ energies for the foreseeable future.121  
 Japanese public opinion has traditionally been more accepting of 
governmental authority, with a sharp drop in the past two decades 
following a prolonged economic slump. However, in a very short time, 
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has generated a great deal of political 
capital with which to negotiate TISA. The initial results of “Abenomics” 
seem to be generating a rising stock market and improving business 
sentiment122 and Abe’s Cabinet approval rating now stands above 
70%.123 On the other hand, the Japanese organization of agricultural 
interests, JA-Zenchu, is a strong and vocal protectionist group, 
representing a predominant public concern with national interests.124 
Although agriculture is not directly on the table in TISA, JA-Zenchu has 
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weighed in on other issues of national interest, such as health care, in the 
past.125 Additionally, while trade issues are relatively unknown in other 
countries, discussions of national interests in potential trade agreements 
are frequently front-page news in Japanese newspapers.126 
D. The Sovereignty Factor: Shallow Regulatory Convergence 
 The biggest prize127 and the hardest puzzle128 for TISA will be greater 
regulatory convergence. Trade negotiators’ traditional area of expertise, 
border measures, have little bearing on trade in services. Negotiators 
attempt to get all sides to move towards common rules, or at least 
regulations that are close enough that each party can accept the others’. 
The issue at the heart of the agreement will be balancing the diverse 
thicket of domestic regulations with the needs of international trade.129 
Negotiations will be difficult.130 Domestic regulations are difficult to 
police,131 hard to measure,132 locally focused and possibly more reflective 
of entrenched national values than the border measures placed on 
tangible goods.133 Even in instances where countries’ goals are aligned, 
an unorthodox regulation that buys off the beneficiaries of the status quo 
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may be preferable to an orthodox regulatory alignment which is 
impossible to implement.134  
 Regulatory coherence within TISA will have to be shallow. Due to 
the fact that all major countries engaging in TISA negotiations are 
developed economies, these nations have already liberalized their 
regulatory measures independently, although to varying degrees. For 
example, both Western Europe and the United States already have low 
regulatory barriers to trade in services, relative to the rest of the world.135 
Despite the fact that these regulatory barriers are low, they show no signs 
of falling any lower. Even between the United States and the European 
Union, regulators’ attempts to move toward common rules have yielded 
little progress.136 WTO rules have been effective in limiting 
discriminatory regulatory measures, but have done little to eliminate the 
non-discriminatory regulations that hinder international trade.137 
Regional trade agreements follow the same approach as the WTO. 
Governments’ rights to regulate are left intact.138 Developed countries 
have been slow in many sectors to adopt international standards.139 WTO 
transparency obligations on regulations of services have also been 
largely ignored, with developed countries being the worst offenders.140 
Conversely, other trade agreements have not improved collaboration 
among regulatory agencies,141 and have not been well received by civil 
society142 or regulators in the United States143 who are not eager to allow 
their responsibilities (for which they are politically accountable144) to be 
subject to potentially increased restrictions. 
Among developing countries, there is also little pressure to attempt 
greater regulatory convergence. They all impose high barriers to trade in 
services.145 There is no global forum or mechanism for fostering a 
discussion of the impacts of service sector policies, or the appropriate 
design of regulations, which are the preconditions for realizing welfare 
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gains from liberalization.146 Regulatory convergence is likely to remain 
an exception rather than a rule.147 
E. The Credence Factor: Subject to Improvement; Falling Short of 
Multilateralization 
The fifth factor in the analysis is whether the TISA Negotiating 
Parties (and other potential members) have a track record of trust, 
established through prior successes and cooperation. Importantly, the 
WTO has been the most successful of humanity’s efforts at a global 
system on a major issue.148 Globally, however, there is a disappointing, 
checkered record of success for international cooperation on recent 
international issues.149 The Center for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) released a gloomy report in 2012 on collective international 
efforts over the past decade and concluded “optimistic anticipation 
has…given way to empty phrase-mongering.”150 Resentment toward 
perceived bullying is another obstacle to collective action. Economist 
Richard Baldwin makes the argument that twenty-first-century PTAs’ are 
much less about the reciprocal negotiation of market access than about 
stronger economies—the United States, the European Union and Japan—
negotiating in the context of significant power asymmetries and 
imposing domestic reforms on weaker countries. In other words, strong 
economies are perceived to be filling the factories of their weaker 
counterparts in exchange for control over weak countries’ domestic 
regulations.151 
Among the TISA Negotiating Parties, the level of credibility is 
higher—one of the factors which may have led to the initial Good 
Friends of Services grouping. However, many of the TISA Negotiating 
Parties have been working on Doha together for over a decade. The 
failure to strengthen the multilateral system by concluding the Doha 
Round is an honest embarrassment and major lack of credibility for 
negotiating countries, especially those at the forefront in the G20.152 
Those members of the G20 who have joined TISA negotiations are: the 
United States, the European Union (including France, Germany, Italy, 
and the UK), Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and 
Turkey. Are these countries responsible for the Doha?153 The members of 
the G20 that have not joined the TISA negotiations are: Argentina, 
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Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. 
If responsibility for the withering death of Doha is laid at the feet of 
these eight countries (BRICS+3?), perhaps that will allow the remaining 
members of the G20 to negotiate TISA with genuine trust in their 
partners, and with optimism for the prospect of cooperation. 
 More broadly, however, is there credence in the concept of a 
plurilateral or multilateral services agreement at all? The WTO’s GATS, 
the first multilateral agreement to address trade in services, achieved 
little actual liberalization.154 In fact, the implementation of GATS does 
not seem to have had significant effects on global trade at all. It is 
difficult to separate trade in services from trade in goods. However, 
while trade grew at roughly 11% per year in the decade before the 
Uruguay Round (1985–1995),155 in the decade since the Uruguay Round, 
the rate has been closer to 5%.156 It is possible that there may have been 
an exogenous process that promoted trade in services before GATS, and 
which ceased afterward. The telecommunication and financial 
revolutions in the early 1990s are potential contenders.157 Nevertheless, it 
is hard to imagine any such combination of processes which would 
coincidentally negate any and all gains from GATS at precisely the same 
time that the agreement was coming into effect. The more likely 
conclusion is that all the growth in trade of services since GATS must be 
attributed to advances in technology158 especially in communication 
technology159 and also in transportation as well as unilateral 
liberalizations.160 
 GATS did lock in the level of services liberalization that countries 
had already achieved through unilateral reforms, ostensibly adding 
certainty to services trade.161 However, many countries committed 
themselves to levels of openness that were actually less liberal than their 
applied measures, leaving room for later adjustments within the 
agreement.162 Additionally, despite using a limited and cautious 
approach, the GATS obligations agreed to by WTO members have, in at 
least one case, turned out to be the reverse of what was intended.163 As a 
result, GATS schedules have grown increasingly irrelevant.164 
 If the approach to TISA was considered a clear innovation on GATS, 
the Negotiating Parties would enjoy the benefit of faith in the potential of 
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that new innovation. However, the compromises announced thus far have 
revealed a negotiating plan remarkably similar to GATS, with general 
obligations and a positive list of specific commitments that give 
members the option to schedule trade liberalization in service à la carte, 
and to exclude controversial service sectors,165 albeit with the addition of 
a negative list of National Treatment obligations.166 Only the hoped-for 
addition of GATS-plus regulatory provisions holds any promise of 
something new.167 Even in this area, other modern preferential trade 
agreements have not yet played a role in promoting service exports.168 
F. The Tractability Factor: We’re Liberalizing in the Dark 
 The sixth factor is whether the trade negotiation is approached with 
sufficient understanding to practically solve the problems. Intractability 
refers to a high level of complexity, which makes it difficult to change, 
manipulate, or resolve an issue. Are services too complex to negotiate? Is 
the challenge of the services trade liberalization in existing WTO 
frameworks169 a consequence of a high level of complexity? 
 The first obvious hurdle is the structural resistance of service 
industries, in other words, separating tradable services from non-tradable 
ones. It is possible to separate them. Jensen, working through the 
Peterson Institute, has identified tradable service industries and 
occupations by locating national service industries with unusually high 
geographical clustering within the United States but broad consumption, 
thereby determining which services are already traded between American 
states. Software, for example, is consumed everywhere in the United 
States, but its development is clustered in Silicon Valley, and so software 
development is a tradable service. From his calculations, Jensen 
concludes that approximately sixty percent of services in the United 
States are currently tradable.170 
 However, Jensen readily admits that there is not enough information 
about current trade flows in the services sectors he has identified. He 
states “[t]here are more than 10,000 manufacturing categories reported 
on monthly from the U.S. census. Since 2006, there have been thirty 
service categories that are reported on quarterly by the U.S census. There 
is a lot more detail than before, but it’s not enough.”171 So we know 
which service sectors are tradable in the United States, but we do not 
know anything about how they are currently traded. Similarly 
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understanding for the success or failure of other countries in exporting 
services is hampered by the lack of available data.172 
 The supply of services is not well understood, either. The GATS 
agreements is divided into four modes of supply, but the division of 
supply under GATS into Mode 1 (cross-border), Mode 2 (consumption 
abroad), Mode 3 (commercial presence), and Mode 4 (natural presence), 
is impractical for real economic analysis. The different modes of supply 
can complement or substitute for one another differently for specific 
services.173 Instead, Jensen asserts that “[s]ervices are not delivered as 
Mode 1 or 2 or 4—they are delivered as Mode 1 and 2 and 4, and parsing 
that mix is difficult. Mode 3 is important, but separate—it works in a 
very different way.”174 
 The biggest problem for TISA’s negotiators is a potential conflation 
of the unknown functioning of trade in services with the relatively well-
known functioning of trade in goods. Services are frequently treated as a 
type of good by trade theorists. Some economists, including Bhagwati, 
argue that we do not need a new structural framework for the services 
sector—that the basic concepts of international trade theory are as 
applicable to services trade as they are to goods.175 Others, for reasons of 
complexity of services and service sectors, believe that a clearer 
conceptual understanding of services trade is required before any 
theories can be drawn about the consequences of service trade 
liberalization—on both economies and public policy objectives.176 
Looking at the loose definitions and underperformance of GATS, and the 
increasing interconnectedness of international trade, it is easy to 
appreciate that caution. 
 Despite being the first and only WTO trade agreement on service 
trade, GATS contains no explicit definition of a service. Instead, services 
have been defined in trade theory as either not-goods (a diverse group of 
economic activities distinct from manufacturing, mining, and 
agriculture)177 or simply by a list of industries or sectors.178 Yet the 
economic functioning of services has the potential to be radically 
different than that of the services’ counterparts such as the industrial 
sector or goods sector. Contrasted with goods, services are intangible; 
they add value to the client directly (possibly, but not necessarily, by the 
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transfer of rights to a good); they are simultaneously created and 
consumed in a transaction (meaning they are also non-perishable, non-
transferable, and non-storable); they are co-produced by the provider and 
client; they are un-able to be inspected before delivery and therefore 
priced with more emphasis on client expectations and less on real utility, 
quality, cost of production, or taxes; they able to be delivered in dynamic 
ways; and—most importantly for trade agreements—they are able to 
generate (potentially unforeseeable) linkages by facilitating the 
production of other commodities in an economy.179 
 International trade increasingly involves intermediate goods and tasks 
along continuums of global supply chains.180 Anecdotal evidence is easy 
to come by: a Barbie doll is manufactured in a crisscrossing web of tasks 
performed in seven countries;181 Apple’s iPhones are notoriously 
designed in California, sourced throughout Asia (adding 35% of its value 
in Japan), and assembled in Shenzhen, China (adding only 4% of the 
final value);182 and, according to the WTO, the value of typical American 
car includes 30% from Korea, 17.5% from Japan, 7.5% from Germany, 
4% from Taiwan and Singapore, 2.5% from the UK, 1.5% from Ireland 
and Barbados, and the remaining 37% of the production value from the 
United States.183 In these fragmented webs of production, the line 
between goods and services is becoming less and less theoretically 
relevant to multinational corporations. Is the final layer of paint applied 
to a car a service or the manufacture of a product? Does it matter whether 
the paint is applied at the dealership, or the factory—or by another 
corporation entirely? Some economists have been working to create a 
model of these new processes,184 yet the core of international trade theory 
continues to be dominated by thinking about production and exchange of 
completed goods.185 
 The negotiations themselves are yet another added complexity to 
TISA. Tariff preferences can be changed incrementally, but preferences 
for services are much more radical commitments—on/off switches that 
either allow a trading partner to serve your market or not.186 
Consequently, there is much more potential trade displacement with a 
change in service preferences, and therefore a much greater value given 
to agreements which include some WTO members but shut out others.187 
A change in service preferences would be a huge advantage for first 
runners, those given market access before any others. In addition, trade 
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negotiators are typically experienced in dealing with border measures, 
which require a completely different sort of competences and have little 
bearing on services.188 Finally, negotiators have few benchmarks or 
measures of progress in service negotiations.189 During Jensen’s launch 
of his book at the Peterson Institute’s policy brief, a veteran of the Doha 
Round negotiations posed an illustrative scenario in which he compared 
negotiating tariffs and service schedules:  
 
You establish a benchmark for reducing tariffs, and it’s 
either zero or it’s a given percentage, and subsequently 
you look at products and you average it out, and you get 
to a certain tariff reduction. [But] anybody who’s seen a 
services schedule knows that it takes about five months–
six months–just to understand what’s in the schedule. 
It’s extremely difficult to actually find an objective way 
of benchmarking and quantifying liberalization by third 
countries who have barriers…. So I think there’s a real 
problem in terms of the complexity of services schedules 
and finding a coherent way in which you can agree 
around the table on benchmarks to liberalize services. I 
don’t know if you have a magic bullet for that 
problem….190  
 
 Jensen replied: “There is a thicket of policy impediments. Measuring 
service imports and exports is very difficult. It’s not clear that we’re 
providing the level of resources that need to be provided to measure it 
well. We’re largely in the dark.”191 Reaching practical economic or 
political goals through TISA using the current set of analytic tools seems 
impractical. 
G. The Resources Factor: Too Few Negotiators, Regulators, and Money 
 The final factor in the analysis is the extent and quality of the 
resources devoted to addressing the problems and doing the work of 
negotiating TISA. The United States is the world’s largest economy and 
the single largest player in the WTO system, TISA, and two other 
ambitious regional trade negotiations happening simultaneously. And 
yet, USTR—which is responsible for negotiating U.S. trade agreements, 
participating in global trade policy organizations, resolving U.S. trade 
disputes, and most importantly gathering input on trade issues and 
helping to formulate the President's trade policy positions—currently has 
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only 179 full time employees, down from 198 employees in 2011.192 
USTR was ranked last in work quality among twenty-nine small U.S. 
federal agencies in late 2012.193 In that comprehensive survey, USTR 
staff showed dissatisfaction with their jobs, their organization, and the 
effectiveness of their senior leaders.194 General budget pressures have 
been exacerbated by the fact that some of USTR's general funds have 
been redirected to another agency, the Interagency Trade Enforcement 
Center (ITEC).195 
 If negotiating service trade agreements is resource-intensive for the 
United States, it is considerably more so for its trading partners.196 The 
people working in trade matters for other TISA Negotiating Partners are 
presumably fewer in number and have less expertise and educational 
background than in the United States. Through this paper’s analysis I 
have concluded that TISA’s potential is not being realized with the level 
of resources currently allocated. To reach that potential, a significantly 
higher commitment is required. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Whether it is a shallow deal or a deep deal, the trade negotiations of 
various governments are working to find “equilibrium of agreement” on 
TISA.197 Liberalization along the lines of TISA is a risk free proposition 
for developed countries, subject to the political skill of governments, 
incremental improvements in the credence of trading partners, and 
sufficient resources to complete the task. However, the conclusion of 
TISA will very likely produce a shallow agreement with little 
understanding of the effects of the liberalization gained. In sum, like 
GATS before it, the deal will be a large investment, a drain on the 
credibility of the world system, and will have little foreseeable value. 
Multilateralization of such a deal will be easier if it is obviously shallow; 
however, WTO members outside the TISA Negotiating Parties are 
deeply skeptical of both the proposed agreement and its proponents’ 
records. Multilateralization under the current circumstances is 
exponentially more unlikely if the deal has any real content at all. 
It is likely that trade negotiators among the major economic powers 
are well aware of these conclusions. Keynes infamously wrote that “it is 
better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed 
unconventionally,”198 and protecting the reputation of the parties may 
ultimately be the overriding goal of the negotiations. It is also possible 
                                                
 192 New USTR Will Face Many Challenges, Including Staff Dissatisfaction, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/201302112424255/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/new-ustr-
will-face-many-challenges-including-staff-dissatisfaction/menu-id-948.html.  
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Goswami et al., supra note 85, at 4. 
 197 Horlick, supra note 94. 
 198 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 
127 (2009). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW                        VOLUME 10 
25 
 
that negotiators are approaching TISA with a gambler’s dice and an 
alchemist’s kit,199 knowing that no harm can come from trying, and 
wasting resources on the hope that despite all indications to the contrary, 
lightning may strike. 
 If these presumptions are false, the recommendations that follow 
address the deficiencies of the TISA. These recommendations might 
assist negotiators’ efforts toward TISA’s two original explicit goals: the 
liberalization of services and the multilateralization of the concluded 
agreement. The recommendations are selectively adapted from Thomas 
J. Bollyky’s chapter on regulatory coherence in The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-first Century Trade Agreement,200 
Jensen’s full recommendations in Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts, 
and Offshoring, from the Peterson Institute for Economic Cooperation,201 
and Sherry Stephenson’s presentation, “Regulatory Disciplines in Trade 
Agreements,” given at the Australian Services Roundtable in 2007.202 
A. More Research, Theory, and Data on Services Trade 
 The first step will be to abandon all hope and embrace data. We need 
more research, and more intellectual and economic theory on trade in 
services. Dorothy Dwoskin, senior trade policy director for Microsoft, 
made the case eloquently at an event with the USTR. She argued that 
"we've gotten so wrapped up in process, in procedure, we've lost sight of 
the economic arguments of why services are so important…you need to 
spend a lot more time helping create the intellectual and economic 
argument on services trade liberalization.”203 These efforts must go 
beyond economic and intellectual cheerleading to the level of a concerted 
effort by the United States and its trade partners to support academic 
theoretical and field research in services trade, and in trade as a whole. 
As a necessary corollary, all trading partners must devise methods to 
collect substantially more and better data on the service sector,204 and to 
aid developing countries in their efforts to collect the same. To succeed 
in liberalizing services trade we can no longer fly blind. 
B. A Multilateral Effort on Regulatory Convergence 
 Drawing from Bollyky and Stephenson, a significant agreement in 
services must address the serious challenges with regulatory coherence. 
A sincere attempt to build regulatory coherence would be reflected in an 
independent multilateral effort to promote regulatory convergence and 
cooperation. The resulting mandate of such an effort would be preparing 
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common technical regulations and standards, formulating Mutual 
Recognition Agreements with conformity assessments, assessing and 
recommending adoption of international standards, and promoting the 
sharing of surveillance data and inspection reports through the 
development of confidentiality arrangements.205 Maintaining sovereignty 
and local accountability of national regulatory authorities will be 
essential for meaningful participation across a multilateral field. The 
participating governments must be confident that the final decision to 
adopt the recommendations of regulatory coherence would remain with 
them.206 
 
C. Additional Recommendations 
 
 Seeing where services might be headed, Jensen proposed defensive 
and offensive actions. Of the former, he suggested that the United States, 
in cooperation with its developed trade partners, make access to primary, 
secondary, and post-secondary education a high national priority. Jensen 
further urged more attention be given to education at all ages, in order to 
maintain American workers’ high skill level. He also added that the 
United States should defensively strengthen its social safety net for 
workers dislocated by trade and technological advancement.207 On the 
offensive, he called for an “aggressive push” to open large, emerging 
markets, liberalize the WTO, enlarge the GPA, and improve IP 
protections. The defensive proposals make good policy sense now—even 
if trade in services reveals strange new dynamics to trade, developed 
countries will only be stronger with high quality education and protection 
for workers. The offensive proposals are contradictory, and should be 
shelved until given effective foundations. 
 Even in its current form, the potential of TISA depends on the 
political skill of governments and the bridge-building skills of the 
parties’ trade negotiators. Those factors should merely be reinforced. To 
address the future goal of multilateralization, WTO members outside the 
TISA Negotiating Parties must be convinced (and not pushed)208 into 
appreciation of the merits of services trade liberalization, and the sincere 
interest in reciprocal negotiations by the TISA Negotiating Parties. These 
factors should follow from the above suggestions. Of course, sufficient 
resources must be found to complete these tasks.  The final factor, the 
most difficult task in political life is to perceive the low rumble of a 
distant crisis and then take responsibility for a new order of things. True 
leadership is a necessary factor in all of the above. 
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